Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

SAGETRACK

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Party Politics
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Brinegar Duke, A.
Right arrow Articles by Nielson, D.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

The PRI’s Choice

Balancing Democratic Reform and its Own Salvation

Adam Brinegar Duke

University, Department of Political Science, Box 90204, Durham, NC 27708-0204, USA. apb7{at}duke.edu]

Scott Morgenstern

Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 4807 Posvor Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA. smorgens{at}pitt.edu

Daniel Nielson

Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA. dan_neilson{at}byu.edu

This article explores the puzzle of why Mexico’s long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) implemented a series of electoral reforms in 1996 that precipitated its own downfall. Previous work explaining the process of Mexican democratization focuses on foreign pressures, interparty bargaining and a unified PRI. Alternatively, we argue that internal divisions in the PRI–conjoined with the threat of a presidential deal with the opposition–determined the particular shape of the reform. The article uses a bargaining model to illustrate the conjunction of interests between the President and PRI hard-liners while taking into account the shadow role played by the opposition. We argue, finally, that the model can be extended to aid explanations of other democratic transitions, as well as general cases of majority-party decision-making and coalition bargaining.

Key Words: Mexico • electoral reform • democratization

Party Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1, 77-97 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/1354068806059345


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?