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The PRIs ChoiceBalancing Democratic Reform and its Own SalvationUniversity, Department of Political Science, Box 90204, Durham, NC 27708-0204, USA. apb7{at}duke.edu]
Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 4807 Posvor Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA. smorgens{at}pitt.edu
Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA. dan_neilson{at}byu.edu This article explores the puzzle of why Mexicos long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) implemented a series of electoral reforms in 1996 that precipitated its own downfall. Previous work explaining the process of Mexican democratization focuses on foreign pressures, interparty bargaining and a unified PRI. Alternatively, we argue that internal divisions in the PRIconjoined with the threat of a presidential deal with the oppositiondetermined the particular shape of the reform. The article uses a bargaining model to illustrate the conjunction of interests between the President and PRI hard-liners while taking into account the shadow role played by the opposition. We argue, finally, that the model can be extended to aid explanations of other democratic transitions, as well as general cases of majority-party decision-making and coalition bargaining.
Key Words: Mexico electoral reform democratization
Party Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1,
77-97 (2006) |
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