Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

SAGETRACK

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Party Politics
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Reed, S. R.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Party Strategy or Candidate Strategy

How Does the LDP Run the Right Number of Candidates in Japan's Multi-Member Districts?

Stephen R. Reed

Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University, 742-1 Higashinakano, Hachioji City, Tokyo 192-0393, Japan, sreed{at}fps.chuo-u.ac.jp

Under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV), political parties are faced with the strategic problem of matching the number of candidates to their vote total. Running either too many or too few candidates may lose a seat that could otherwise have been won. Many studies have confirmed that Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) solved this strategic problem relatively well and ran close to the optimal number of candidates. Each of these studies makes the standard unitary actor assumption that the LDP can be understood as if it were a single individual maximizing its total number of seats in the Diet. Even though these unitary actor models have produced an impressive account of LDP nomination policy, I argue for an alternative decentralized model based on candidate strategy. The primary mechanism producing the optimal number of LDP candidates per district is not strategic decision-making by the party headquarters, but competition among strategic candidates. Political parties are organizations and therefore capable of unitary action, but parties are also arenas for competition among factions and candidates. The LDP was not a coherent organization but rather an open arena for candidate competition.

Key Words: franchise party • Japanese politics • Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) • M+1 rule • nomination strategy

Party Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3, 295-314 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1354068808097894


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?