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Party Politics
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Clientelism Versus Ideology

Problems of Party Development in Brazil

Daniel J. Epstein

Harvard University, Massachusetts, and University of Rochester, New York, depstei3{at}mail.rochester.edu

Although aggregate data on party competition in Brazil seem hopeful, unsettling trends appear in state-level party systems in the years of the consolidation of Brazilian democracy (the period this article examines extends through the 2002 elections), such as instability and fragmentation, which exceed the extent of problems apparent at the national level. These hamper the informational role parties can play for voters picking from a large number of candidates. While other possible explanations shed little light on these problems, a hypothesis about clientelistic party-building strategies may explain the patterns in party competition across states. Such strategies depend on the distribution of selective benefits, such as patronage or vote-buying, to attract candidates, elicit votes and gain office for the party. Clientelistic party-building strategies provide no extra-material incentive for party cohesion, and may stymie the development of a stable competitive system. Furthermore, it is through clientelism that party clans exercise hegemony over the local political system in some states, promoting an undemocratic monopoly on power.

Key Words: Brazil • clientelism • political parties • regional politics

Party Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3, 335-355 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1354068809102250
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